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Tax rates on business income in many countries increased enormously during World  
War I and stayed at a much higher level than before the war. Particularly, the UK multinationals  
with subsidiaries based elsewhere other than the Empire suffered from the situation because the  
UK did not provide a foreign tax relief until 1945, when a tax treaty with US was signed.  
The aim of this paper is to clarify the historical premises of establishment of the tax  
treaty in 1945. The major premise of this paper is that the double income tax discouraged  
Britons’ investment and impaired their competitiveness in US in 1914-1945. Nevertheless, it  
took three decades to realise the treaty. The first step was a 1936 tax on dividends paid to  
corporate shareholders. UK multinationals had to pay American dividend tax as well as British  
income tax and American corporation tax. For instance, J&P Coats, which had extensive  
interests in the US, would have had to pay a dividend tax of 10 percent. J&P Coats succeeded in  
tax planning which reorganised their British and American subsidiaries. Nonetheless, J&P Coats  
and other companies petitioned the UK government to eliminate the double income tax. The  
second step towards realisation of the treaty occurred after the outbreak of World War II. The  
problem of double income tax  made a number of corporations regard transfer pricing as a  
method to avoid US taxation. Transfer pricing by using two invoices was, however,  
unsatisfactory to at least UK government authorities. UK abandoned inter-imperial preferential  




                                                          
1 This discussion paper is based on a paper for European Business History Association Conference 2014. 
Please do not quote without author’s permission. Email address: ryoizawa130@gmail.com 
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1.  Introduction 
This paper clarifies the extent to which multinationals responded to international  
double taxation on business income (double income tax), which had been recognised as a  
serious problem since the Firs World War.  The paper also explores how reactions by  
multinationals formed international tax policy. To make clear these points would provide food  
for thought to deal with the today’s topic about tax avoidance of multinationals such as Pfizer  
and the plans of global tax advocated by reformists like the members of a panel in the United  
Nations (OECD 2013, p. 13; Economist 2014; United Nations 2001, p.28).  
In particular, this paper takes up the behaviours of UK multinationals in the US from  
1914 to 1945 and the UK-US tax treaties in 1945. The reason is that the UK had the largest  
stock of outward FDI in the world between 1914 and 1938 (Jones 2005, pp. 21-22). Besides  
that, according to Picciotto (1992), a turning point in the development of international tax  
arrangements through bilateral tax treaties after the Second World War was the successful UK- 
US tax treaty in 1945. 
Among previous studies, Wilkins (2009) highlights that double income tax curtailed  
UK foreign investment in the US, but she cites scant examples involving UK multinationals.  
The extent to which double income taxation influenced UK multinationals and the reasoning  
underlying the UK-US tax treaty remains unspecified. Picciotto and Jones (2009) describes  
briefly the history of UK-US discussions over double income tax, drawing mainly on official  
records from the Foreign Office and the UK’s Inland Revenue. Although they convincingly  
describes the process of the treaty from a political perspective, they do not pay attention to  
the action of companies affected by double income tax. They then assume that the  
multinationals continued to complain about the double income tax strongly from 1914 to 1945.  
Eventually, they do not elucidate how and why the bilateral treaty with the US originated and  
was supported (or not supported) in the UK. 
We explore how UK multinationals adapted to double income tax and why the  
bilateral tax treaty was concluded in 1945. We follow corporate behaviour based on a case  
4 
 
study constructed on the basis of company material (J & P Coats), as well as records of general  
meeting of stockholders in newspaper archives, a record of the Federation of British Industries  
and some official government documents. 
 
2.  The road map to the UK-US treaty 
The problem of double income tax in the UK deteriorated mainly because income tax  
rates all over the world as well as in UK increased after the outbreak of the First World War.  
For example, in 1913, a UK multinational which was resident in UK but had a branch in US  
was obligated to pay US tax (1%) on its US profit of ￡100 and UK tax (5.8%) on its net profit  
of ￡99, leaving a net profit of about ￡93.3 (See Figure 1).2 However, by 1918, such a UK  
multinational was forced to pay a US tax of 12.5% on its￡100 profit and UK income tax of  
30% on its net ￡87.5 foreign income. Thus, net profit on same amount of gross profit dropped  
from ￡93.3 to ￡61.6. In spite of the fact that the double income tax between UK and US was  
recognised as a hardship, foreign tax relief or tax treaty between UK and US was forgone in  
inter war period. This section investigates the behaviours of UK multinationals and the process  
of making bilateral tax treaty with US between 1914 and 1945, dividing the time period into  
five parts. 
                                                          
2 This paper only uses US federal tax to avoid confusion. See the footnote No.3 in this paper, which 




(Sources) Peden, G. C., The Treasury and British Public Policy 1906-1959, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 44, 
94,149,207,212,268,287; Taylor, J., ‘Corporation Income Tax Brackets and Rates, 1909-2002’, IRS, Statistics of 
Income Bulletin, 2003, pp.287-288. 
 
2. 1 1914-1919 ―Occurrence of the problem of double income tax 
 In this period, the issue of double income tax became a public concern, which  
provoked complaints against the problem by UK multinationals and suggestion of plans to  
resolve it.  
 The first complainant about the double income tax problem between UK and US  
was the Investment Trust Corporation, a trust company which invested in US securities. The  
company complained about tax increases in the US, claiming that ‘the future may, in this  
direction, hold grave dangers for a country like our own’ (The Times: Investment Trust  
corporation, 1916). J&P Coats, a thread company which had extensive interests in the US, also  
complained about double income tax  internally in its general meetings in 1918 and 1919 (J&P  
Coats: GB 0248 UGD 199/1/1/67).  
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In response to such complaints, the Royal Commission on Income Tax, which was  
established in 1919, took up the double income tax problem to try to find a solution to it. In  
the Commission, two witnesses explained the difficulties caused by both UK and US taxes. One  
witness, Archibald Willamson, who was a Member of Parliament of the UK as well as an owner  
of a trading company based in UK and US, explained the plight of his company, suggesting a  
worldwide foreign tax credit scheme such as that in the US. He also mentioned that separation  
of foreign houses from their head office in the United Kingdom was becoming more common  
and the independence of the foreign houses must eventually tend to weaken the tie with  
Britain. He worried about the loss of British commerce caused by double income tax (Minutes  
of Evidence, [7405-7659]). Another witness was more important. Adam Morimer Singer, who  
was a son of the founder of the Singer Manufacturing Company, protested against the severe  
taxes and suggested the UK-US bilateral tax treaty to prevent double income tax (Minutes of  
Evidence in Royal Commission, [5179]). That is to say, the idea of bilateral treaty between UK  
and US was born almost at the same time as the double income tax problem, albeit the  
embodiment of the bilateral tax treaty in 1945.  
 
2. 2 1920-1924 ― Rebuff of double income tax relief outside Empire 
 Despite the discussion in the Royal Commission, the UK did not provide the double  
income tax relief other than for the British Empire. Nevertheless, it did not reject the idea of  
bilateral tax treaty completely. On the other hand, UK multinationals responded to the  
evolving business conditions, changing their business organisation and investment strategy to  
deal with the double income tax in other ways.  
The final report of the Royal Commission on Income tax recommended no change in  
the existing situation as to double income tax by the United Kingdom government and by the  
government of foreign states. On the contrary, it encouraged the introduction of foreign  
income tax relief within the British Empire up to one-half of the rate of the UK income tax. The  
reason of the difference between in and outside the Empire was that the government  
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authorities such as Inland Revenue abhorred losing financial sources. The difference was  
also affected by the fact that the Association of Protest against the Duplication of Income Tax  
within the Empire, established in 1915, demanded the tax relief within the British Empire  
strongly. On the contrary, similar groups to demand the tax relief outside the Empire eagerly  
did not appear. Then, the UK established the Financial Act 1920 which only provided the  
income tax relief within the British Empire (The Association of Protest against the Duplication  
of Income Tax within the Empire 1916, Seed and Rawlinson 1925, p.5, The Report of the Royal  
Commission on the Income Tax 1920, pp. 16-19).  
However, the report did not wipe out the idea of bilateral tax treaty.  It also  
recommended putting forward the idea under the auspices of the League of Nations. Thus, the  
concept of bilateral treaty was officially accepted but was restricted to the term, ‘under the  
auspices of the League of Nations’, in the report of Commission (Report of Commission 1920,  
p.19). 
In response to the enactment of the unequal tax relief, UK multinationals based in the  
US chose to change their investment strategy and business organisation. For example,  
Investment Trust Corporation, mentioned above, practically gave up its investments in the US.  
Its holdings in US securities fell from 37% of its all investment in 1914 to 3% in 1923 owing to  
the double income tax. The company also stated that it did not plan to re-entry into US in the  
near future (The Times: Investment Trust Corporation, 1923). The case of Arizona Copper  
Company, a UK mining company which had a US division, was more drastic.  On September  
1921, it decided to sell the US division to Phelps Dodge, a US mining company. According to  
the Times report, one of the main reasons was the double income tax (The Times: Arizona  







2.3 1925-1935 ―Impasse of debate about double income tax 
Although the discussion about double taxation (including double taxation on business  
income)  in the League of Nations was sparked off just after the foundation, concrete  
measures to solve the problem could not be realized either internationally or in the UK. On the  
other hand, taxes on business income levelled off in this period. Although the governments did  
not have the reason to levy the taxes more, they had no reason to reduce the taxes which  
became the foundation of the social welfare. In addition to the fact that UK multinationals  
reorganised their business just after the War, the complaint of UK multinationals was placated. 
The committee of Technical Experts, a special committee in the League of Nations,  
acknowledged in 1925 that multilateral tax treaty method had a difficulty of viability because  
different countries had different tax rules. And it suggested that countries conclude  
bilateral agreements. Following the suggestion, the League of Nations made model  
bilateral tax treaties in 1928 which were expected to be basis for some bilateral tax treaties.  
However, the model tax treaties had a drawback. They requested the concession of tax  
revenue of capital-export countries such as the UK because they acknowledged that  
host countries could impose taxes on business income partially (Picicotto, pp.18-24).  
In response to the discussion in the League of Nations, the Federation of British  
Industries, which was one of the largest employers’ association in the UK, requested bilateral  
tax treaties without the auspices of the League of Nations in negotiations with the Inland  
Revenue in 1925 and 1929 (Federation of British Industries: MSS200/F/3/E4/5/1). Although  
Winston Churchill, the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1926, agreed with the group’s idea,  
Philip Snowden, the Chancellor in 1930, only stated that international conference might ‘come  
to some satisfactory conclusions’ (The Times: ‘Tax Burdens on Industry’ 1926; The Times:  
‘British Trade Paradoxes’ 1930). Yet again, the reason why UK government authorities  
abhorred concluding tax treaties based on the model treaty was that they did not want to give  
up their tax source.   
In contrast with the political standstill, business conditions improved, mainly  
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because tax rate of both countries levelled off. As for corporate behaviour, Swan Land  
and Cattle Company in 1926 converted its US division into US subsidiaries in order to escape  
the UK income tax (Wilkins 2004, p.222).3  On the other hand, newspapers such as the Times,  
the Financial Times and the Economist at that time did not report any complaints about  
double income tax between UK and US, with one exception. The Olympic Portland Cement  
Company, a cement maker mainly based in US and UK complained about the double income  
tax problem every year (at least from 1924 to 1944) at its general meeting. The company,  
however, only complained about the double income tax between UK and US. It is unknown  
whether the company engaged in tax planning or not (The Times: Olympic Portland Cement  
Company).  
  
2.4 1936-1939 ―Triple tax  
 The impasse of the political debate about double income tax continued  
during the period from 1936 to 1939. Yet the introduction of US dividend tax in 1936  
exacerbated the business situation more. UK multinationals were forced to adapt to the  
environment, again. 
The US Revenue Act 1936 taxed dividends paid to corporate shareholders (United  
States Government Printing Office 1936). As a result, UK multinationals had to pay American  
dividend tax as well as American corporation tax and British income tax. For example, a UK  
multinational based in the US suffered from the US dividend tax of 10%, US corporation tax of  
15% and UK income tax of 23.75% in 1936. When a US subsidiary of UK multinationals paid  
the dividend to its parent company, the corporate group was obligated to pay US corporation tax  
(15%) on its US profit of ￡100, US dividend tax (10%) on its net profit in the US of ￡85 and  
UK income tax (23.75%) on its net profit of ￡76.5, leaving a net profit of about ￡58.3.4 
                                                          
3 Converting branch into subsidiary could prevent double income tax unless the US subsidiary remitted its 
profit to the parent company, due to the fact that UK tax authority could not levy its income tax on 
overseas legal entity. 
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 Needless to say, the double income tax problem with US became a public concern for  
the first time in about 20 years. The Times and the Economist reported the double income tax  
problem between UK and US in 1937 (The Times: ‘Double Taxation and the U.S.A.’ 1937; The  
Economist: ‘Invest Notes’ 1937). In the annual meeting of the H. P. Sauce, a sauce product  
company which had large interests in the US, stockholders complained about the double  
income tax problem in the general meeting in 1938 and 1939 (The Times: H. P. Sauce 1938,  
1939). 
 Furthermore, with regard to the case of J&P Coats, we can follow the detailed  
steps taken in response to the double income tax problem. The company reorganised  
their business group structure to avoid the triple taxes.  
On 26 September 1936, the Liaison Committee 4, which was a division of J&P Coats  
and administered to harmonize communication between US and UK, received a proposition  
of tax planning from the Executive committee in New York. The proposition was that they  
wanted to avoid the additional taxation because, ‘as a result of recent legislation, a tax of 10%  
would, in future, be levied on dividends paid to the Parent Company’ (GB 0248 UGD  
199/1/1/82, p. 233). This motion of tax planning was dealt in the Financial Committee which  
was also a division of the headquarters and administered the company’s finances.  
After consulting with Barrow, Wade, Guthrie & Co, a US accounting firm that  
                                                                                                                                                                          
4 According to a report made by the British Empire Chamber of Commerce in the United States of 
America in 1938, the effect of double taxation on the profits of a typical subsidiary company located in 
New York States with a declared capital stock value of $5,000,000 and earnings of $500,000 before taxes 
was shown below:  
 
 Tax Rate Profits subject to Tax Amount of Tax 
State Income or Financial Tax 6% $500,000.00 $30,000.00 
Federal Capital Stock Tax: ($1.00 per $1,000 
of declared value) 
  $5,000.00 
Federal Income Tax 16.5% $465,000.00 $76,725.00 
Federal Tax on Dividends 10% $388.275.00 $38,827.50 
National Defence Contribution Tax (UK) 5% $349,447.50 $17,472.37 
British Income Tax 27.5% $331,975.13 $91,293.16 
Total Tax   $259,318.03 




had originated as a British accountancy firm, J&P Coats decided to engage in tax planning  
starting on 16 November 1936.  The decision also meant that J&P Coats reorganised its  
group structure because the US dividend tax could be circumvented if income of its  
subsidiaries in the US was less than half of world income of J & P Coats (GB 0248 UGD  
199/1/1/24, p. 328; Wilkins 1989, p.536).  
Specifically, J&P Coats let an existing UK subsidiary, I. P. Clarke & Co., took over  
total holdings in the US subsidiary companies.  I. P. Clarke & Co. took over from J&P Coats its  
entire holdings in the J&P Coats (Rhode Island) and United Thread Mills, both of which were  
US subsidiaries of J&P Coats. In addition, I. P. Clarke & Co was converted into a Private  
company due to the reason that the UK company law at that time permitted the private  
company not to register their profit and loss balance sheet.  Namely, I. P. Clarke & Co. could  
conceal information about the company profits from the public (GB 0248 UGD 199/1/1/24, pp.  
328-329, 331, Gower 1969, p. 13).  
According to the material of Financial Committee, the estimate of tax saving in a year  
was ＄126,000（￡25,200）whereas the cost of the scheme was ＄20,000, clearly a good  
investment in ‘tax planning’. And the saving money was equivalent to about 1.3% of total  
profit of J&P Coats in 1936, ￡1,925,137.  Then, the tax planning was approved by the board  
meeting on 1 Dec 1936 (J&P Coats: GB 0248 UGD 199/1/1/82, p.240; GB 0248 UGD  
199/1/1/24,  pp. 329; UGD 199/1/1/5). 
 Although some companies managed to the impact in 1936, the triple tax worsened as  
time went on. Even J&P Coats which executed the tax planning successfully in 1936 must have  
reviewed the scheme on 14 February 1938 because ‘the chance of avoiding taxation had been  
worsened since November 1936’. However, the board decided not to put forward to the  





2.5 1940-1944 ―Outbreak of Second World War 
 The double income tax problem deteriorated sharply mainly because of the outbreak  
of the Second World War. This tax burden encouraged the UK multinationals to engage in  
more skilful tax planning and led to the negotiation of the UK-US tax treaty in 1945.   
In this period, both governments levied tax on business income heavily. For example,  
in 1944, UK income tax surged to 50%. The US also levied corporation taxes of 25% to 40% as  
well as a dividend tax of 30%. 
In response to the tax situation, UK multinationals based in the US engaged in tax  
planning more keenly. And a variety of UK multinationals complained about the double  
income tax problem in their general meetings. Eventually, the UK Treasury was forced to  
prohibit companies domiciled in the UK from transferring their businesses abroad without the  
prior consent of the authority on 27 September 1940 (The Times: ‘Transfer of companies  
abroad’ 1940). Moreover, it was unveiled in the meeting between Treasury, Foreign Office and  
Inland Revenue that British firms with major US subsidiaries (thought to number 57) had taken  
legal advice about ways to circumvent the double income tax. In particular, transfer  
pricing using double invoices was taken up an imperative matter to be solved. According to a 
material of the meeting, “One method is to fix a maximum invoice price here at such a level  
that the American branch makes no profit. This meant showing two prices on the invoice, but  
even so the American customs accept the lower price and take no notice of the higher price to  
the ultimate purchaser” (Foreign Office: FO371/38588). 
As a result, many multinationals’ complaints and tax planning encouraged the UK  
Foreign Office to discuss and negotiate a bilateral tax treaty with US. It also abided by the spirit  
of the Atlantic Charter. Thus, the UK-US tax treaty in 1945 was established in response to  







 Double income tax problem appeared during World War impeded investment in the  
US by UK multinationals, which complained about the problem. One witness in the Royal  
Commission on the Income Tax in 1919 suggested a UK-US bilateral tax treaty and addressed  
the issue in its 1920 report, but it recommended only instituting tax relief within the Empire  
and concluding bilateral tax treaties under the auspices of League of Nations. The Finance Act  
of 1920 provided no relief outside the Empire, but it prompted multinationals based in the UK  
and US to reorganise business structures and investment strategies shortly after World War I  
ended.   
Although discussions about double income tax in the League of Nations produced  
model bilateral tax treaties in 1928, the solution could not be realized in the UK  because  
British authorities were reluctant to relinquish tax revenue. Moreover, change of UK  
international tax policy was not needed in the first half of the interwar period, mainly because  
the tax rate had been levelled off and UK multinationals had completed their business  
reorganisations. 
The year 1936, when the US added a dividend tax, was pivotal in the development of  
UK-US double income tax. Along with the deterioration of tax burden, UK multinationals  
engaged in more skilful tax planning. After considering current and future business and  
political conditions, the UK government decided to conclude the bilateral tax treaty with the  
US in 1945. 
 In sum, double income tax from 1914 to 1945 compelled UK multinationals in the  
US towards tax planning to alleviate its impact. For companies such as Arizona Copper, that  
meant liquidating US operations. Some UK multinationals avoided double tax by reorganising  
their business structures as J & P Coats did. Or others engaged in transfer pricing. Although the  
current media report how multinationals, such as Pfizer, use different national tax systems to  
avoid taxes and are likely to regard it as a novel matter, the topic is a century old. 
The response of UK multinationals affected the conclusion of UK-US tax treaty in 1945.  
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However, the UK multinationals not always claimed the settlement of the double income tax  
problem strongly throughout the period. The response sometimes did not support the  
political movement to solve the double income tax problem. The UK multinationals did not  
stress on settlement of the double tax problem between 1925 and 1936 since those  
based in the US had completed reorganising their structures and investment strategies just  
before. The response would contribute to the rebuff of debate in the League of Nations as  
well as application of bilateral tax treaties with the US without the auspices of the League of  
Nations. Yet it does not mean that the response to multinationals determined the conclusion  
of bilateral tax treaties. When the UK multinationals in the US complained a lot about the  
double income tax between 1914 and 1925, the idea of tax treaty with the US, came up with in  
1919, was shelved politically. Eventually, the UK–US tax treaty was concluded in 1945 because  
political and business demands are matched at last during the World War II. The history of  
making tax treaties in 1945 indicates that creation of international tax policy is based on  
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